The Bank has raised a jurisdictional objection to be decided by a Panel of the Tribunal, established in accordance with Article V(2) of its Statute.

The Applicant was appointed as a stenographer on an allegedly Temporary appointment in the Islamabad Country Office as of February 1, 1968. His appointment was changed to Regular, effective February 1, 1969. On March 12, 2001, the Applicant was provided with a mutually agreed separation (MAS) package (“the Agreement”). The Agreement stated that on June 30, 2001, the Applicant would receive a lump-sum severance payment equivalent to 14.40 months’ of his then current monthly net pay.

The Applicant filed an appeal with the Appeals Committee on June 15, 2004, challenging the Bank Group’s alleged failure to pay him a Termination Grant which included the first year of his employment, i.e., February 1, 1968, to January 31, 1969. He also claimed that, as a former Local Staff member, he was eligible to receive an increase of 7% in his Termination Grant for his service for the period February 1, 1968 to April 14, 1998. As a relief, he requested payment of these benefits.

In sum, the Tribunal finds no exceptional circumstances or other reasons that would excuse the Applicant’s failure to exhaust internal remedies in a timely manner with regard to any of his claims.

In conclusion, the Tribunal recalls that it has in the past sanctioned the Bank for “mismanagement of [an] Applicant’s career” on the basis of its “behavior towards the Applicant … taken as a whole.” See Chhabra, Decision No. 139 [1994], para. 57. In this case, the Applicant has clearly sought to present herself as the victim of precisely such a comprehensive failure. Moreover, she has put her complaint in virulent terms, referring to “the sustained, collusive and intentional destruction of Applicant’s career prospects by Bank managers in various units,” and “truly endless abuses” which, she says, “seem driven by personal prejudice, arrogance, and an institutionally ingrained pattern of cynicism and hypocrisy.” The Applicant has not come close to proving such dramatic charges. Nor does she come close to demonstrating that the Bank has, on the whole, mismanaged her career. It is true that the Bank’s response to the Applicant’s reinstatement has been unimpressive, indeed to a degree which merits sanction. But the Applicant’s own contributory conduct has been so questionable that the Tribunal is unconvinced that she suffered prejudice as a result of the Bank’s deficiencies. The prosecution of her claims since the autumn of 2001 (that is to say in the proceedings that gave rise to the judgments in Yoon (No. 3) and Yoon (No. 4)) has been highly unprofessional. The record suggests that her conduct in the field was also marked by extreme negativeness: the only ideas she seemed to approve were her own, the only initiatives she viewed with enthusiasm were those unaffected by the input of her colleagues or her managers, and her inability to avoid friction in her most significant professional interactions seems to have been total. These considerations, added to those set out in paragraph 60, lead to the conclusion that the Applicant’s own contribution to her difficulties was so significant that the Bank’s inadequate handling of her reinstatement cannot be considered the dominant cause of her obvious career disappointment. She remains a senior staff member. The Bank does not guarantee that individuals will attain their career objectives within the Bank. The Applicant has not proved that the Bank placed obstacles in her way. In sum, the Bank’s partial failings in this case, as recorded above, ultimately appear to have had the principal effect of exacerbating the Applicant’s dissatisfaction and litigiousness. That itself is a serious matter (although very far short of the claim of destroying a career), and merits a sanction.
For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal awards compensation in the amount of US$40,000. This amount includes costs.

The Applicant contests the decision to declare her position redundant and the failure of the Bank to find her alternative employment. She asks principally for rescission of the redundancy and for compensation.

The application presents the Tribunal with an appeal from a decision of the PBAC directing the payment of Fritz Rodriguez’s lump-sum death benefit under the Staff Retirement Plan and Trust (SRP) to his former second wife, Hafida Rodriguez, rather than to his estate. The question presented is whether this decision by the PBAC was consistent with the Bank’s governing rules and was reasonable, or whether it constituted an abuse of discretion.

The Bank has raised a jurisdictional objection to be decided by a Panel of the Tribunal, established in accordance with Article V(2) of its Statute. 

Before this Tribunal, the Applicant now brings fifteen grievances mainly concerning her developmental assignment in ECA’s Human Development Sector Unit (“ECSHD”) from February 2002 through August 2003. Thirteen of these grievances in substance repeat claims raised in her Appeal No. 1295. 

Claims (8) and (9), concerning the SRI ratings for 2002 and 2003, were not included in the Applicant’s claims before the Appeals Committee. Not having brought these claims before the Appeals Committee, the Applicant cannot bring them before this Tribunal.

As to the remaining thirteen grievances, it should be observed that underlying all of them are two principal claims or premises, namely: (1) the Bank failed to reinstate the Applicant to a comparable position; and (2) the Bank has treated her like a second-class citizen. These principal claims were dismissed by the Tribunal in Yoon (No. 4).

What remains to be examined by the Tribunal on the merits are claims (5), (6), (7), (11) and (15).

For the above reasons, the Tribunal decides that:
(i) it will examine in their entirety the merits of claims (5), (6) and (7) of the Applicant;
(ii) it will examine the merits of claims (11) and (15) only inasmuch as they relate to claims (5), (6) and (7);
(iii) the dates for the filing of pleadings on the merits will be determined by the President of the Tribunal and
communicated to the parties; and
(iv) all other claims of the Applicant are dismissed.

The May 21 application contests the decision of the Respondent not to pay the Applicant for the overtime that she worked. The May 25 application complains that the Respondent: (a) denied the Applicant a permanent position as earlier promised; (b) terminated her employment prematurely in retaliation for her having filed an appeal in another case and for having rejected a coterminous position (expiring with the exhaustion of its funding); (c) defamed the Applicant to the detriment of her career; and (d) abused its power in her most recent Overall Performance Evaluation (OPE) while she was in the Agricultural and Rural Development Department (ARD).

The Applicant contests the Bank’s decision not to confirm his Open-Ended appointment. The Applicant also alleges harassment, retaliation and a lack of support and guidance from management.

The Applicant contests the decision to declare him redundant and the allegedly unfair denial to him of further employment. He seeks rescission of the redundancy, compensation and costs.

The Applicant, a level H Manager, challenges the decision of the Manager, Human Resources Service Center (HRSSC) and Senior Advisor, Human Resources Vice Presidency, to deduct $699.65 from the Applicant’s net annual salary of $141,326, and to forward the amounts so deducted to his former spouse as semi-monthly court-ordered spousal and child support payments. Although the Applicant does not challenge the accuracy of the calculation of most of the deduction, he contends that these semi-monthly payments should be reduced by $193.40 by virtue of what he regards as a straightforward interpretation of his Divorce Decree, and that the Bank has erred by declining to do so. By virtue of what the Respondent regards as an equally straightforward interpretation of the Divorce Decree, it contends that the decision of the Manager, HRSSC, was proper and should not be overturned by the Tribunal.

The Applicant joined the Bank in 1971 as a Transport Economist and was declared redundant in 2000. He retired at Grade G and received the pertinent separation benefits in 2001. The Applicant contested the redundancy decision before this Tribunal, a claim that was dismissed in 2003.

The Applicant contests the following decisions: (1) the refusal to place under seal her former manager’s charges of misconduct relating to a statement of travel expenses from a mission in January/February 2000; (2) the initiation of a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) in November 2000 and her previous, related performance evaluations; (3) the decision to extend the PIP in November 2001; and (4) a January 16, 2002 memorandum noting that the PIP had ended and warning against any future slippage from the performance standard required.

The Bank has raised a jurisdictional objection to be decided by a Panel of the Tribunal, established in accordance with Article V(2) of its Statute. The Applicant asserted that he was unhappy with the working environment of SFRCF. He claimed in his application that in his recent Overall Performance Evaluations (“OPEs”), his managers did not evaluate him fairly and properly. The Bank challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, contending that this application is inadmissible under Article II of the Statute of the Tribunal “except for the challenge to the 2002 OPE.”The Tribunal decided that the application is inadmissible, except with respect to the claim relating directly to the Applicant’s 2002 OPE. 

The Applicant contests the decision that declared him redundant. He claims that it violated Staff Rules, was an abuse of discretion and resulted from age discrimination. He asks for rescission of the redundancy and reinstatement with back pay or compensation.

The Applicant’s argument appears to be an effort to tack numerous alleged Bank acts and “decisions” since the mid-1990s onto his complaint about his 2002 OPE, by alleging that those old acts and “decisions” constituted evidence of a “pattern” of “abusive treatment and retaliation” on the part of the Bank ultimately leading to the allegedly unfair evaluation in his 2002 OPE. The Tribunal decides that the application is inadmissible, except with respect to the claim relating directly to the Applicant’s 2002 OPE. 

The Applicant complains that the Bank has not promoted her, despite the fact that she is qualified for a higher grade and has performed duties at that grade for a significant period of time and with considerable success. The Applicant also complains that when she sought a re-evaluation of her post in accordance with the Staff Rules, her Sector Director did not follow through. If she had done so, the Applicant contends, her job would have been upgraded and she would have been promoted. She further complains that after she lodged an appeal concerning this situation, the Bank retaliated against her by curtailing her responsibilities and by giving unfair evaluations of her performance. She seeks promotion from Grade E to Grade F retroactive at least to July 2002, compensation and costs.

It appears to be clear, and agreed by the parties, that the Applicant’s complaints stem principally from his academic pursuits and quest for funding by the Joint Scholarship Program, rather than from the terms of his employment contract as a Short-Term Consultant. The Respondent consequently argues that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae over these claims because the Applicant was not a staff member at the time of the challenged decision to withdraw funding, and otherwise because the claims have nothing to do with the
Applicant’s employment with the Bank. The Applicant, meanwhile, contends that the Joint Scholarship Program is an “activity administered and executed by the [Bank’s] staff under its Staff Rules and Regulations,” and that its failure to abide by these rules grants him standing to pursue his claim. The Applicant characterizes his connection with the Joint Scholarship Program as a “derived relationship” between himself and the Bank. The only right which the Applicant could seek to vindicate with respect to the flag question would be that of entering the Bank’s premises without hindrance. Such an outcome would be contrary to common sense as well as to the decision in B, in that it would ignore the Bank’s reasonable efforts to control access to its premises, particularly by persons who are not currently members of the staff. The Applicant’s claim in this respect would therefore be without merit even if jurisdiction were to have existed on this question. For the above reasons, the Tribunal decides to dismiss the application.

In the end, the test is not who was the most pleasant and constructive but whether there is any evidence that the Bank abused its discretion in implementing the Tribunal’s judgment. The record before the Tribunal does not begin to justify the accusations levied by the Applicant. For the above reasons, the Tribunal decides to dismiss the application.

The Applicant had worked ably in the Legal Department (“LEG”) of the World Bank for some six years under a Term appointment with a number of extensions. Her employment terminated according to its terms on the stipulated expiration date, March 29, 2002. Having exhausted her remedies within the Bank in a timely fashion, she now challenges this termination, contending principally that it violated several assurances given to her by the General Counsel and the Managing Counsel of LEG that her appointment would be regularized upon demonstrated satisfactory performance, and that it also violated a number of the Respondent’s procedural rules.The Tribunal cannot find that any of these conclusions constituted an abuse of discretion. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal decides to dismiss the application.

The Applicant is challenging the correctness or appropriateness of certain adverse comments made in his FY02 performance evaluation (“PEP”) by his reviewing Director. The Applicant asks for the deletion of the reviewing Director’s comments from his PEP. He is also contesting the reasonableness of the comparative performance rating (“SRI rating”) of 3.1 that he received, as well as its concomitant 1.3% salary review increase (“SRI”). The Applicant asks for the upward adjustment of his SRI from 1.3% to 6% and the recalculation of all benefits due on his separation from the IFC (he was declared redundant in the course of the reorganization of the IFC in 2002) and his pension. The Applicant estimates the additional non-pension benefits that should accrue to him upon such re-calculation to be US$25,000. He also seeks damages for prejudice allegedly caused by his reviewing Director’s comments consisting of failure to secure other employment within the Bank and loss of reputation, in the amount of US$450,000, and costs amounting to US$8,500.

The Applicant seeks an order setting aside the Respondent’s decision not to confirm her employment, compensation equivalent to three years’ net salary plus benefits for loss of career opportunities and mental suffering, the deletion from her file of all references to her nonconfirmation for performance-related reasons, and legal costs.