In his application Mr. Carter contests, and requests rescission of, the Bank’s decision of June 22, 1995 not to renew his consultant fixed-term contract after its expiration date. This decision, he maintains, was made “on the basis of racial discrimination.” The Applicant also contests, and requests rescission of, the Report of the Appeals Committee of May 7, 1996 which, he complains, failed “to recommend awarding of relief.” The Applicant finally contests, and requests rescission of, the decision of May 9, 1996 by which the Vice President, Human Resources, decided to accept the Appeals Committee’s recommendation; this decision, the Applicant maintains, failed to “fully consider the section titled REASONS in the Report ... which clearly indicated an abuse of discretion, improper practices, and evidence of racial discrimination on the part of the respondent.”

In her application the Applicant requests the rescission of “[t]he decision of the Appeals Committee of October 10, 1995” denying the relief she had requested following the termination of her 24-year employment at the Bank's East Africa Regional Office in Nairobi, Kenya. The Respondent having raised the question of the admissibility of the application on the ground of its untimeliness, and the President of the Tribunal having granted the Respondent's request to separate the jurisdictional issue from the merits, the present judgment will deal exclusively with the question of jurisdiction.

The principal issue in dispute between the Applicant and the Respondent is whether subjecting the Applicant to the time restriction on consultancy services imposed by Staff Rule 4.01, as amended in April 1994, violated his conditions of employment and terms of appointment.

The Applicant has made three claims against the Respondent in respect of the following: 1) the Respondent’s failure to provide effective and substantive relief that would restore his career and professional reputation; 2) the Respondent’s decision to award “inappropriately low and below-norm salary merit awards for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995”; and 3) the Respondent’s “abusive employment practices” which caused and continue to cause him loss of reputation and career prospects.

Summarily dismissed.

In the present proceeding, the Applicant seeks "reconsideration and correction of the record in Decision No. 148." T

The Applicant now requests review of the Tribunal’s Decision No.150 based on Article XIII(1) of the Statute. This states: A party to a case in which a judgment has been delivered may, in the event of the discovery of a fact which by its nature might have had a decisive influence on the judgment of the Tribunal and which at the time the judgment was delivered was unknown both to the Tribunal and to that party, request the Tribunal, within a period of six months after that party acquired knowledge of such fact, to revise the judgment. The Applicant submits that a fact has been newly discovered which “might have had a decisive influence on the judgment of the Tribunal.” She claims further that this fact was unknown to her and to the Tribunal at the time the judgment was delivered on May 14, 1996.

The Applicant claims that the decision of the Bank taken on January 26, 1995 to declare his position redundant was an abuse of discretion and seeks reinstatement or compensation

The Applicant complains that she was made redundant in violation of express reentry guarantees given by the Respondent and that such a decision was also in violation of Staff Rule 7.01, paragraphs 8.02 and 8.03.

The principal decision contested by the Applicant is the Bank’s giving him a 1995 merit award of 3 minus, reflecting the lowest salary increase for “fully satisfactory” performance. He also challenges an earlier investigation of him that was carried out by the Respondent’s Ethics Officer. The Respondent has raised a jurisdictional objection to the application, alleging a failure to exhaust internal remedies in a timely manner as required by Article II of the Statute of the Tribunal; and it has requested that the jurisdictional issue be separated from the merits of the case.
 

The Applicant in this case contests the validity of the Bank’s decision to declare his position redundant.
 

The Applicant complains that his position as Senior Public Information Officer in the External Affairs Department (EXT) was declared redundant in violation of Staff Rule 7.01, paragraphs 8.02 and 8.03. He contends that the newly created position of External Affairs Counsellor in the same Department (to which he was not appointed) was in essence identical to the one the Applicant had previously occupied and that his position was abolished by the Respondent not in the interests of efficient administration but in order to allow the recruitment of a younger staff member

The Applicant requests the rescission of the 1993 PPR and the merit award based on it. He also seeks compensation for the improper merit increase, for moral damage and for costs.

The subject of the application is the Applicant’s complaint that she was not paid the amount appropriate to her position from February 1992 until the date she left the Bank on June 30, 1995. The Respondent has raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, arguing that, by reason of Article II, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, the Applicant was required to have exhausted all other remedies within the Bank and that the application must have been filed within 90 days after either the occurrence of the event giving rise to the application or after receipt of notice -- following the exhaustion of all other remedies available within the Bank -- that the relief asked for will not be granted.

The Applicant claims that her position was improperly declared redundant in 1994--a claim which requires a close scrutiny of the work performed by the Applicant in her original position and the work allocated to the positions which she claims eventually replaced it.

The Applicant claims that her position was improperly declared redundant in 1994--a claim which requires a close scrutiny of the work performed by the Applicant in her original position and the work allocated to the positions which she claims eventually replaced it.

 The principal issue in dispute between the Applicant and the Respondent is whether subjecting the Applicant to the time restriction on consultancy services imposed by Staff Rule 4.01, as amended in April 1994, violated his conditions of employment and terms of appointment.
 

In this case, the Applicant challenges, by reason of the assurances given by the Bank in conjunction with the separation agreement, the application to herself of the change in the Staff Rule whereby persons previously employed in the Bank may not act as consultants to the Bank for more than 120 days in any twelve-month period. 

The Applicant, a United States national entitled to tax reimbursement, on three occasions falsely completed Tax Allowance Certificate forms applying for such reimbursement and consequently received from the Bank sums which he should have used to pay his taxes, but did not. The Applicant also fell into arrears with the payment of both his Federal and his State income taxes, a situation which led the IRS in 1994 to request the Bank to attach part of the Applicant’s salary to meet his obligations. Having regard to its immunity, the Bank declined to comply with this request. The Applicant had committed a similar violation of the Bank’s Rules in 1985 and had at that time been warned in writing that a further occurrence of the same kind could lead to the termination of his employment. On the second occasion, the Bank terminated the Applicant’s employment.

The Applicant presents two principal arguments. The first disputes the Respondent’s view that the Applicant’s conduct constituted serious misconduct under Staff Rule 8.01. The second contends that the severity of the penalty imposed by the Bank was disproportionate to the offense committed.

The Applicant contests the decision of the Bank not to confirm his appointment at the end of his probationary period and to place him on administrative leave several weeks before the date on which this period was to end. He requests various reliefs, in particular compensation in the amount of six times his net salary.