Although the Applicant invokes the provision in Article II, paragraph 2, of the Statute that allows the Tribunal to excuse the Applicant from the requirement of exhausting internal remedies when there are “exceptional circumstances,” he did not set forth any such circumstances, and the Tribunal is unable to discern any.
 

The main contention of the Applicant is that the Respondent failed to meet its obligation under the Bank’s rules by evaluating the Applicant’s position as one of Editorial Assistant at grade 17 when it should have evaluated said position as that of an Editor at grade 20 or 21. Application dismissed.

The Tribunal concludes that in the present case there were no exceptional circumstances that might have put the Applicant under pressure and prevented him from complying with the prescribed time limits. It is exclusively to his own conduct that the untimeliness of his application to the Tribunal can be ascribed, as it was also to his own conduct that the rather extraordinary four-year delay to appeal to the Appeals Committee must be attributed.

The Applicant makes the following pleas: (i) rescission of the decision that the Applicant’s service was unsatisfactory; (ii) rescission of the decision that the Applicant’s employment be terminated; (iii) extension of the Applicant’s contract of employment so that he may serve a probationary period in conformity with the Staff Rules; (iv) payment of 3 years salary and benefits including annual increments; (v) payment of $25,000 for the stress, anxiety, professional humiliation, pain of mind and uncertainty to which the Applicant has been subjected during a period of 18 months; and (vi) payment of $4,340 as reimbursement of travel and living expenses incurred on the Applicant’s visit to the United Kingdom to seek renewal of his refugee status.
 

The Applicant’s principal contention is that the Respondent placed her in a position within the Temporary Assignment Program (TAP) in the course of Round 2 of the Bankwide Reorganization that was in fact provisional and impermanent, rather than regular and indefinite. This action by the Respondent, she claims, was taken without her knowledge, was intentionally concealed from her, created a cloud upon her employment status, and was purposely taken by the Respondent so as to deprive the Applicant of the economic benefits that would otherwise have accrued to her under the Enhanced Separation Package (Package B) available to staff members rendered redundant in the Reorganization. 

The Applicant's main contentions: (1)The Respondent violated the provisions of Staff Rule 8.01 and did not observe due process because the allegations against the Applicant were not communicated to him; (2) The Applicant was prejudiced by the violation of Staff Rule 8.01 and the non-observance of due process; (3) The Applicant was not informed of the testimony of others so that it could not be rebutted and hostile witnesses could not be confronted; (4) The Ethics Officer was prejudiced and did not conduct a fair inquiry because, prior to investigating, he had read the report of the departmental investigating officer; (5) The Respondent had found the Applicant guilty by association because it did not want to send lower level staff the wrong message; (6) Denial of promotion to the Applicant, which was one of the sanctions imposed, was not among those listed in Staff Rule 8.01; (7) The Applicant was not given the Ethics Officer’s report till after the proceedings before the Appeals Committee had been initiated. Thus, he did not have a fair opportunity to defend himself. (8) Insofar as the Appeals Committee considered together the appeals of several appellants including the Applicant, there was a violation of Staff Rule 9.03 which requires consideration by the Appeals Committee of appeals on a case-by-case basis; (9) There is no evidence that the action taken against the Applicant was in response to institutional needs as a penalty for mismanagement, independent of the finding of misconduct.

The question for consideration in this case is whether the separation agreement signed on July 25, 1991 was freely entered into by the Applicant and therefore, should be treated as a legal barrier preventing the Applicant from bringing the substance of her application before the Tribunal.

 The Respondent’s position is that the application is not properly before the Tribunal because in bringing it the Applicant failed to exhaust the Bank’s internal remedies laid down by paragraph 2 of Article II of the Tribunal’s Statute. The Respondent points out that under the Statute the Applicant could validly have prosecuted his grievance directly before the Tribunal without exhausting its internal remedies, only if both he and the Respondent agreed to this course. The Bank said it had not agreed to any such course. Application inadmissible. 

The Applicant contends that the decision not to declare him redundant was unlawful; he impugns the recommendation of the Appeals Committee that his appeal be dismissed; and attacks the legality of the decision of the Vice President, Personnel and Administration, accepting that recommendation.
The issue is whether before he left the IFC’s service the IFC was obliged to convert his fixed-term appointment to a regular one, declare him redundant and pay him redundancy benefits as he claims.

There are two main complaints of the Applicant in this case, namely: (i) that the Applicant was entitled to be considered for appointment to a regular staff position and that the Bank in failing to do so was in breach of her terms of employment; and
(ii) that the Applicant was entitled to be appointed consultant for a 4-year period and the Bank’s refusal to grant her an extension for such a period was a breach of her terms of appointment. 

 The issue before the Tribunal is whether the Respondent’s decision on the Applicant’s merit increase for 1988 on the basis of his performance as a Senior Investment Officer was lawful. 

The Tribunal concludes that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a general rule of the Respondent rather than the application of that rule in a particular case so as adversely to affect the Applicant in the form of “some detriment to his own status, compensation or working conditions resulting from a specific Bank decision affecting him.” 

The Tribunal concludes that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a general rule of the Respondent rather than the application of that rule in a particular case so as adversely to affect the Applicant in the form of “some detriment to his own status, compensation or working conditions resulting from a specific Bank decision affecting him.” 

The Tribunal concludes that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a general rule of the Respondent rather than the application of that rule in a particular case so as adversely to affect the Applicant in the form of “some detriment to his own status, compensation or working conditions resulting from a specific Bank decision affecting him.” 

The Tribunal concludes that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a general rule of the Respondent rather than the application of that rule in a particular case so as adversely to affect the Applicant in the form of “some detriment to his own status, compensation or working conditions resulting from a specific Bank decision affecting him.” 

The Tribunal concludes that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a general rule of the Respondent rather than the application of that rule in a particular case so as adversely to affect the Applicant in the form of “some detriment to his own status, compensation or working conditions resulting from a specific Bank decision affecting him.” 

The Tribunal concludes that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a general rule of the Respondent rather than the application of that rule in a particular case so as adversely to affect the Applicant in the form of “some detriment to his own status, compensation or working conditions resulting from a specific Bank decision affecting him.” 

The Tribunal concludes that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a general rule of the Respondent rather than the application of that rule in a particular case so as adversely to affect the Applicant in the form of “some detriment to his own status, compensation or working conditions resulting from a specific Bank decision affecting him.” 

The Tribunal concludes that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a general rule of the Respondent rather than the application of that rule in a particular case so as adversely to affect the Applicant in the form of “some detriment to his own status, compensation or working conditions resulting from a specific Bank decision affecting him.” 

In his application, the Applicant challenges the Bank’s rule that all “new staff who have held U.S. permanent resident (PR) status or U.S. citizenship at any time in the 12 months prior to appointment to the Bank will be ineligible for expatriate benefits.” This general rule was made effective on January 29, 1985. It was, in effect, reiterated in the Applicant’s letter of appointment given him prior to his taking up service with the Bank in January 1988. That letter stated: You are being appointed to the staff of the World Bank in U.S. Permanent Resident status. Therefore, you are not eligible for expatriate benefits such as home leave and education benefits. The Applicant also points to the written communication of the VPP, to the Staff Association, dated August 24, 1990, stating that “Management has decided not to change the current policy with respect to eligibility for expatriate benefits.” He contends that this was the last event giving rise to his application, and thus that his request for administrative review, and ultimately his resort to the Tribunal, were timely.