The Applicant challenges, and seeks the expunging or correction of, several memoranda from his Section Chief setting forth criticisms of the Applicant’s performance, his PPRs from 1989 and 1990, and his lower-thannorm salary merit awards in 1989 and 1990. He claims that those documents and decisions manifest bias, malice and unprofessional behavior on the part of his supervisors, namely his Section Chief and the next-in-line supervisor, the Division Chief, who the Applicant contends conspired to slander and denigrate him in order to furnish a basis for his termination.
 

Withdrawal.

The Applicant’s first complaint is that he was wrongfully terminated from the service of the Bank in violation of the Principles of Staff Employment and the Staff Rules. He alleges in this respect that when he was declared redundant because his services no long matched the required skills, no consideration was given to providing him with training to fill the position. He also asserts that the Respondent did not make good faith efforts to find him alternative employment and that the supervisor who initiated the termination wanted to open up a position for a consultant he wished to hire.

 The Tribunal, therefore, concludes that the application, dated September 9, 1991, filed more than two and a half years after the Applicant received notice of the final decision of the PBAC affirming the Bank’s decision to make his pension effective November 1, 1987, is time-barred and inadmissible.

 The main issue in this case is whether the Respondent forced the Applicant to take early retirement without compensation, and, if this was the case, whether such conduct amounted to a violation of the Applicant’s contract of employment

The Applicant’s first submission is that the Respondent’s sudden reversal in 1990 of its policy of grandfathering the Applicant’s salary at level 26 notwithstanding the level of positions he had occupied since 1985 violated the terms and conditions of the Applicant’s employment contract. He refers, in particular, to the Bank’s continued practice since 1985 and to two Bank memoranda to him from the VPP in 1988 and the Director, PEROP, in 1989. The Tribunal will consider each of these items in turn.

The Applicants contend that the termination of their salary grandfathering and the resulting administration of their 1990 salaries within their downgraded salary range violated contractual assurances, essential terms of their employment as elaborated in precedents of the Tribunal, and the Principles of Staff Employment.
 

The Applicants contend that the termination of their salary grandfathering and the resulting administration of their 1990 salaries within their downgraded salary range violated contractual assurances, essential terms of their employment as elaborated in precedents of the Tribunal, and the Principles of Staff Employment.
 

As the Tribunal has already held in Abdi et al., the termination of salary grandfathering, beginning in May 1990, did not violate any express provision in the Applicants’ contract of employment, for the Respondent cannot reasonably have been found to have given an assurance, expressly or impliedly, that salary grandfathering for all staff members downgraded in the 1985 Job Grading Exercise was to continue indefinitely.The Tribunal also rejected the contention of the Applicants in Abdi et al. that the Respondent’s termination of salary grandfathering constituted in effect a unilateral modification of an essential right of the Applicant as defined by the Tribunal in de Merode, Decision No. 1 [1981]. The Tribunal concluded that neither a consistent and longstanding practice, nor confirmatory statements manifesting an obligation, gave rise to a duty on the part of the Respondent to continue salary grandfathering indefinitely.

The Applicants contend that the termination of their salary grandfathering and the resulting administration of their 1990 salaries within their downgraded salary range violated contractual assurances, violated essential terms of their employment as elaborated in precedents of the Tribunal, and violated the Principles of Staff Employment. 

The Applicant's main contentions:
The policy of “grandfathering” the Applicant’s salary at her former grade level during the years 1987 through 1989 which was confirmed by the Board of the Bank and a memorandum from the VPP made continued “grandfathering” of her salary an essential condition of employment for the Applicant, which could not be unilaterally changed by the Respondent;
Limitation of “grandfathering” of salaries to two years is a violation of the essential conditions of employment entitling staff members to periodic salary increases in which various relevant factors had to be taken into account. This was particularly so because the salary of the Applicant could reach a level where it would be frozen. The fact that the “minimum increase” was given to the Applicant whose salary was near the top of her range and might otherwise have been frozen does not change the situation;
The Bank acted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner against the Applicant because it decided a priori and regardless of the Applicant’s individual merit and performance that the “minimum increase” was appropriate for her at the time of the 1990 salary review;
The limitation of the “grandfathering” of the Applicant’s salary was retroactively enforced;
There was discrimination between the Applicant and those staff members who earlier had been in the same grade as the Applicant but had not been downgraded. The difference in their positions was based on pure chance and was unjustifiable;
The failure to continue to “grandfather” the Applicant’s salary violates the Principles of Staff Employment which require that the Respondent establish programs to reward staff performance because, though the Applicant’s performance continued to be satisfactory her grade had been lowered and she was subjected to a mechanistic system of compensation adjustment which did not promote performance at a high level by a downgraded staff member.
 

The Applicant contends that the termination of her salary grandfathering and the resulting administration of her 1990 salary within the level 17 salary range violated contractual assurances, violated essential terms of her employment as elaborated in precedents of the Tribunal, and violated the Principles of Staff Employment.
 

The Applicant requests that the Tribunal rescind the Bank’s decision to bar him from its employment until the year 2000, and pay him compensation for the loss and damage he suffered as a result of that decision and costs of the proceedings.

The Applicant was not a staff member at the time the decision complained of was adopted, nor is he alleging that there was a contract of employment whose terms had not been observed or in regard to which some illegality had been committed.

The principal issue in this case is whether a promise was made by the Respondent to the Applicant at the time of employing him or on his transfer to the Cofinancing Department to convert his fixed-term appointment to a permanent one and, if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether the Applicant’s performance after his transfer was fairly evaluated so as to justify the non-renewal of his fixed-term appointment and the refusal to convert it to a permanent one.

Withdrawal.

 The Applicant’s principal contention is that the failure by the Respondent, during the Bank-wide Reorganization in July 1987, to select her for a position as audit analyst was an abuse of discretion, being discriminatory or at least arbitrary and capricious. She claims that the individual who had effective decisionmaking power in the Reorganization – the person who at that time was the Acting Director of the Internal Audit Department (IAD) and who had previously for a short time been the Applicant’s supervisor – was biased against the Applicant on account of the Applicant’s criticism of him to Bank officials and her knowledge of alleged wrongdoing on his part in his management activities in IAD. The Applicant also claims that the Respondent abused its discretion by appointing the Acting Director to membership on the Selection Committee, despite the Respondent’s awareness of severe and widespread criticism of his integrity by departmental staff.
 

The Applicant’s principal contention is that the failure by the Respondent, during the Bank-wide Reorganization in July 1987, to select him for a position as audit analyst was an abuse of discretion, being discriminatory or at least arbitrary and capricious. He claims that the individual who had effective decisionmaking power in the Reorganization – the person who at that time was the Acting Director of the Internal Audit Department (IAD) and who had previously been the Applicant’s supervisor – was biased against the Applicant on account of the Applicant’s criticism of him to Bank officials. The Applicant also claims that the Respondent abused its discretion by appointing the Acting Director to membership on the Selection Committee, despite the Respondent’s awareness of severe and widespread criticism of his integrity by departmental staff.

The Applicant contends that the Respondent failed to observe the terms of his appointment and the conditions of his employment by: 1. Demoting him without cause from the post of a Division Chief at Grade 26 which he occupied prior to the 1987 Reorganization to that of a Principal Economist at Grade 25, thus violating his right to security in employment which he considers to be an essential element of his conditions of employment. 2. Creating an inaccurate and baseless performance evaluation which resulted in his non-selection for a Division Chief position or for any other grade 26 positions.
 

The Applicant’s main contentions:
The Bank violated the Applicant’s legitimate expectancy for continued employment by denying her permanent employment for several years solely because of her history of cancer;
The Bank’s Medical Department violated the terms and conditions of the Applicant’s employment, because at the time she applied for employment, without giving her a complete medical examination, it refused to give her medical clearance. Therefore, the Medical Department had violated its own rules and deprived the Applicant of the right to be evaluated on the basis of her medical condition at the time of the decision;
The Bank’s Medical Department also arbitrarily refused to declare the Applicant eligible for a five-month renewable appointment, notwithstanding that she had furnished the required medical certificate from her personal physician and that she was willing to pay for her medical insurance;
The Medical Department did not properly follow its own Guidelines in reviewing her case when it declared the Applicant “medically unfit” by classifying her as a candidate for employment instead of considering her as a staff member who fell sick “during employment”;
The Bank acted in violation of the Applicant’s Terms and Conditions of Employment by accepting the recommendation of its Medical Department. The Bank’s financial justification for the application to the Applicant of the five-year rule because of her history of cancer provides little support for its position.