The case raises issues related to the entitlements of persons having served as Long-Term Consultants. Such persons received the same benefits as Long-Term Temporary appointees (hereinafter “Temporaries”), and were collectively categorized with the latter as “non-regular staff” (hereinafter “NRS”). For that reason, the rules relevant here overlap with those pertinent to Vera Caryk (Decision No. 214), also decided on this date, which deals with the application of a Temporary.

The case raises issues related to the entitlements of persons having served as Long-Term Temporary appointees (hereinafter “Temporaries”). Such persons received the same benefits as Long-Term Consultants, and were collectively categorized with the latter as “non-regular staff” (hereinafter “NRS”). For that reason, the rules relevant here overlap with those pertinent to Pillarisetty Madhusudan (Decision No. 215), also decided on this date, which deals with the application of a Long-Term Consultant.

The Applicant contests the decision not to renew his contract. He claims that “[o]ther decisions affecting” him include: (i) an alleged interference in his search for employment within the Bank; (ii) the “Report of the Appeal[s] Committee”; and (iii) rejection by the Vice President of Human Resources Development of a request made by the Applicant “for a mediation.” The Applicant requests fulfillment of the Appeals Committee’s recommendations and financial compensation totaling approximately $137,000 for the “prejudice” that the Appeals Committee “pointed out” but for which it did not recommend compensation. He also requests costs in the amount of $1,000.

This case concerns a complaint by the Applicant regarding a decision of the Bank refusing her request to exercise the option for early retirement under the Rule of 50. The Applicant argues that the Rule of 50 violates the Principles of Staff Employment and amounts to a détournement de pouvoir and de procédure, particularly because Staff Retirement Plan (SRP) assets would be used for purposes other than the payment of retirement benefits and the end result would be a discriminatory and arbitrary policy towards different groups of staff members. The decision of the Bank is also contested on the basis of abuse of discretion, violation of essential terms and conditions of employment and the adverse financial implications that the policy relating to the Rule of 50 would have on the Staff Retirement Fund (the “Fund”).

The Applicant filed an application with the Tribunal claiming non-observance of her contract of employment or terms of appointment. The Applicant challenges the decision not to confirm her position in the Infrastructure Division of the European and Central Asia Region, Country Department 4 (EC4IN) as permanent, a decision which, she claims, resulted from her unwillingness to produce misleading results for a financially nonviable project. She also challenges the Respondent’s subsequent actions which led to her termination from the Bank. These actions include her 1996 performance evaluation (PRR) which, she claims, was not fair and reasonable. She claims that, in addition to procedural irregularities, the Respondent did not observe the Bank’s Code of Professional Ethics. She also alleges that there was an abuse of discretion, improper motive and a violation of fair and reasonable procedures.
 

The Applicant contends that the term “surviving spouse” refers to a person who is married to a retired participant on the last day of contributory service and survives him; that such a person remains a surviving spouse even if divorced from the retired participant at the time of his death; and that a person who is a spouse on the last day of contributory service has an acquired right which cannot be defeated by a subsequent divorce.
 

This case concerns a complaint by the Applicant that the conditions under which he was recruited by the Bank on a fixed-term appointment were not honored and that, as a result, his appointment was neither regularized nor extended. Issues relating to breach of promise and breach of contract have been raised in this connection, together with allegations of arbitrariness and abuse of discretion.

The issues presented by this application relate to the Staff Rules that provide for the payment of a “tax allowance” to staff members who are obligated under the laws of their home country, principally the United States, to pay taxes on their income from the World Bank. Staff members who pay no such income tax in their home country are paid income on a “net of tax” basis; United States nationals, such as the Applicant, are also paid their salary and other benefits on a net basis, but the Bank supplements this with a tax allowance that is intended to generate a “gross” income which, after the payment of U.S. taxes, leaves the U.S. staff member with the same net pay as his non-U.S. staff colleagues. The tax allowance is intended to help the U.S. staff member pay the relevant federal, state, local and social security taxes on Bank income. This tax-allowance system, in its general terms, has been found by the Tribunal to be a “fundamental and essential term of employment” of staff members. (de Merode, Decision No. 1 [1981].) The regulations that govern the computation of the tax allowance are set forth in Staff Rule 6.04. The Applicant contends that the pertinent provisions of Staff Rule 6.04 have been misapplied in his case, resulting in the payment to him of an inadequate tax allowance for the year 1996. He seeks compensation in the amount of $145,000 for the allegedly inadequate tax allowance, along with interest and tax-allowance payments that pertain to any Tribunal judgment in his favor, and expenses in excess of $43,000 in the prosecution of his case.

The subject of the application is the Applicant’s complaint that his regular appointment was unfairly terminated following an investigation of charges made against him of sexual harassment. The Respondent raises an objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, arguing that, contrary to the requirements of Article II, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, the Applicant did not file his application within 90 days following the date on which he received notice that the relief he requested in his appeal to the Appeals Committee would not be granted. For his part, the Applicant contends that he has presented exceptional circumstances. As set out below, the Tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction over the Applicant’s claim

The Applicant is requesting the Tribunal to order the rescission of the Respondent’s decision dated July 14, 1997 to accept the recommendations of the Appeals Committee denying his request for relief for alleged misconduct and sexual harassment by his former supervisor. He is also claiming compensation in the a

This case concerns the implementation of a new rule of the Staff Retirement Plan (SRP), which allows for early retirement at age 50, in conjunction with the provisions of the Staff Rules governing severance payments in situations of redundancy. The Applicant claims that because he has not been allowed to draw unreduced benefits from the SRP as well as severance pay under the Staff Rules he has been discriminated against, retroactively deprived of compensation for services rendered and denied equitable treatment. The decision denying these benefits, it is further argued, violates the Applicant’s conditions of employment and other essential rights established in the Principles of Staff Employment by being arbitrary, discriminatory and unfair and involving an abuse of power and discretion.

The Respondent asserts that the application is inadmissible under Article II, paragraph 2(i), of the Tribunal’s Statute because the Applicant failed to exhaust internal remedies in a timely manner. In particular, it argues that the Applicant failed to request an administrative review of the Respondent’s decision of January 5, 1996 not to extend her resettlement benefits beyond October 31, 1996. 

The Applicant complains that the decisions on redundancy and termination affecting him were pretextual and did not respond to a genuine business rationale. In the Applicant’s view, such decisions were arbitrary and capricious as they were adopted as a reprisal for his intervention in a situation involving his Department Director. Issues of discrimination and forgery have also been raised by the Applicant.

The Applicant was denied reimbursement under the workers’ compensation system established by Rule 6.11 of the Bank’s Staff Rules. His claim was dismissed by the Workers’ Compensation Claims Administrator (hereinafter, the Claims Administrator) and the Workers’ Compensation Administrative Review Panel (hereinafter, the Review Panel), because of the failure to produce medical evidence pertinent to the Applicant’s contention that the deterioration in his health arose from his employment. The Applicant has appealed this dismissal pursuant to Staff Rule 6.11, paragraph 12.04.

This case deals mainly with the Applicant’s claim that the decision of the Respondent, based on the findings of an investigation that the Applicant’s allegations of misconduct by his supervisor and by a colleague were unfounded, was erroneous. The Applicant also claims that he was forced to resign from the Bank and that the Respondent failed to counsel him respecting his rights regarding the signing of a Mutually Agreed Separation (MAS) agreement. In addition, the Applicant also contends that his draft 1995 performance review “contained unfounded and unsubstantiated negative allegations” regarding his performance.

The Applicant specifically contests the decision to declare her redundant on the ground that it was based not on a business rationale but rather on an improper motive, including retaliation for the Tribunal’s finding in her favor in Chhabra (Decision No. 139 [1994]). The Applicant also complains that the Bank did not re-grade her position as it was committed to do. Issues concerning a performance evaluation and the holding of her to a position below her demonstrated capabilities have also been raised in this case.
 

The Applicant claims that the decision of the Bank to terminate her employment was an abuse of discretion in that it was tainted with bias and discrimination arising out of unfair assessments of her in the 1993-1994 and 1994 Performance Review Records (“PRRs”).

The Applicant, who was under a three-year fixed-term appointment, requests the correction of two Performance Review Records (PRRs) and the rescission of his removal from his position to another position within the Bank, along with compensation and costs.

In her Application, the Applicant accuses the Bank of failing to observe her conditions of employment and terms of appointment by: (i) failing to provide her with a work environment free of sexual harassment; and (ii) failing to protect her and to act in a fair and unbiased manner once incidents of sexual harassment were raised by her and, thus, brought to the attention of the Management of the Respondent. On this basis, the Applicant contests the decision of the Respondent that there was no evidence of misconduct on the part of the Director of her Department warranting discipline under Staff Rule 8.01 in respect of the Applicant’s complaint of sexual harassment.

The subject of the application is the Applicant’s complaint that: (i) his position was improperly declared redundant; (ii) the Respondent denied him consideration for the vacant position of Financial Sector Specialist in the Middle East and North Africa Country Department I, Private Sector Development, Finance and Infrastructure Division (MN1PI) that was advertised in May 1996; (iii) the Respondent failed to consider him for other vacant positions of Financial Specialist/Analyst in his Region and in the Bank generally; and (iv) the Respondent failed to make good faith efforts to place him in a suitable position. The Respondent has raised objections to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, arguing that the Applicant has either failed to exhaust internal remedies or has not presented claims that give rise to a question of non-observance of his contract of employment or terms of appointment. As will be set out more fully below, the Tribunal concludes that the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction have not been satisfied with respect to the Applicant’s first, third and fourth claims. It concludes, however, that it has jurisdiction over the Applicant’s second claim.