The subject of the application is the Applicant’s complaint that his regular appointment was unfairly terminated following an investigation of charges made against him of sexual harassment. The Respondent raises an objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, arguing that, contrary to the requirements of Article II, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, the Applicant did not file his application within 90 days following the date on which he received notice that the relief he requested in his appeal to the Appeals Committee would not be granted. For his part, the Applicant contends that he has presented exceptional circumstances. As set out below, the Tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction over the Applicant’s claim.

The Respondent invokes Article II, paragraph 2(ii), of the Statute of the Tribunal, which establishes as a jurisdictional requirement that “the application [be] filed within ninety days after” receiving notice, upon exhausting administrative remedies, “that the relief asked for . . . will not be granted” by the Bank. The application here was posted within ninety days of the decision of the Vice President to accept the recommendation of the Appeals Committee, but it was not received until 17 days later, which was almost two weeks after the deadline for filing as contemplated in the Statute. The Respondent asserts that “filing” is accomplished only when an application is actually received by the Secretariat of the Tribunal.
 

This is an application contesting the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Administrative Review Panel (“the Review Panel”) dismissing the Applicant’s claim for, inter alia, reimbursement of her medical expenses for illnesses allegedly suffered by her in the course of her employment with the Respondent.

This case involves a complaint by the Applicant that the decision to make him redundant was based on improper motives and that a number of procedural and substantive irregularities occurred in this connection. The Applicant has also alleged that the Bank refused to protect his professional reputation in connection with critical press reports about his work on Uruguay. A biased performance evaluation and a low salary increase have also been matters of complaint by the Applicant.

The Applicant requests the rescission of the Bank’s decision to declare his employment redundant under paragraph 8.02(c) of Staff Rule 7.01 on the ground that his skills did not match the changing needs of the Bank.

The subject of the application is the Applicant’s complaint that: (i) his position was improperly declared redundant; (ii) the Respondent denied him consideration for the vacant position of Financial Sector Specialist in the Middle East and North Africa Country Department I, Private Sector Development, Finance and Infrastructure Division (MN1PI) that was advertised in May 1996; (iii) the Respondent failed to consider him for other vacant positions of Financial Specialist/Analyst in his Region and in the Bank generally; and (iv) the Respondent failed to make good faith efforts to place him in a suitable position. The Respondent has raised objections to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, arguing that the Applicant has either failed to exhaust internal remedies or has not presented claims that give rise to a question of non-observance of his contract of employment or terms of appointment. As will be set out more fully below, the Tribunal concludes that the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction have not been satisfied with respect to the Applicant’s first, third and fourth claims. It concludes, however, that it has jurisdiction over the Applicant’s second claim.

 The Applicant challenges the decision to reassign him effective November 1, 1995 from the position of Section Chief of Printing Services in GSD to a nonmanagerial level 23 position in GSDRM, on the ground that the reassignment was implemented in violation of Staff Rule 8.01. He claims that the reassignment was a disciplinary measure stemming from the MCRP and that the Bank failed to comply with the requirements of due process as set forth in that rule. 

The Applicant complains of the termination of her employment on the ground, as alleged by the Respondent, of unsatisfactory performance whereas, in the Applicant’s contention, the true ground of termination was redundancy. Because of the different payments and benefits that each ground entails, the Applicant further complains that she has suffered significant losses in terms of reduced pension, medical benefits, reassignment, training, travel and home leave. Moreover, the Applicant asserts that there have been serious procedural irregularities and abuses of discretion in the manner in which the Bank has dealt with her case, all of which have resulted in a violation of due process

The complaint of the Applicant, who was temporarily appointed on April 18, 1994 for an initial duration of one year, is the Respondent’s non-renewal of his contract, which he considers an illegal act. The Applicant’s letter of employment of April 8, 1994 offered him a “full time temporary appointment” with the Respondent “effective on April 18, 1994” and terminating on April 17, 1995. The letter also stated that the appointment “is subject to the conditions of employment, including the Staff Rules, of The World Bank currently in effect and as they may be amended.” The Applicant’s temporary employment was later extended for a second year, through April 30, 1996.

By letter dated April 24, 1998 the Applicant’s attorney informed the Tribunal that “the Respondent offered to pay [the Applicant’s] legal costs if she would withdraw her Application” and that the Applicant “ha[d] decided to accept Respondent’s offer and withdraw her Application.”
 

This case deals mainly with the Applicant’s complaint that the decision to declare her position redundant was based on a pretext, was against the interests of efficient administration and was implemented contrary to the applicable Staff Rules. The Applicant also alleges various acts of discrimination and denial of equal treatment with other staff regarding outplacement assistance. She further claims that the Bank did not pay her for overtime work.

The Applicant, a Principal Engineer on regular employment with the Respondent at Grade Level 25, requests the Tribunal to declare that the Respondent’s decision to decrease his hardship allowance from 15% to 10% be rescinded. The Applicant was assigned to New Delhi by a memorandum dated September 28, 1994. It was there stated that the Applicant would be entitled to his normal salary and a post allowance composed of: (i) assignment allowance of $5,000; (ii) hardship allowance then calculated at 15% of his monthly net salary; and (iii) cost of living allowance. With regard to the hardship allowance, which is the subject of this application, the Respondent undertook to pay the Applicant a hardship allowance currently calculated at 15% of his monthly net salary for his duty station.

The complaint of the Applicant, who was temporarily appointed on April 18, 1994 for an initial duration of one year, is the Respondent’s non-renewal of his contract, which he considers an illegal act. The Applicant’s letter of employment of April 8, 1994 offered him a “full time temporary appointment” with the Respondent “effective on April 18, 1994” and terminating on April 17, 1995. The letter also stated that the appointment “is subject to the conditions of employment, including the Staff Rules, of The World Bank currently in effect and as they may be amended.” The Applicant’s temporary employment was later extended for a second year, through April 30, 1996.

This is an appeal by the Applicant to the Tribunal from the decision of the Pension Benefits Administration Committee (PBAC) denying the disability pension applied for by the Applicant under Section 3.4(a) of the Staff Retirement Plan of the Bank.

The subject of the application is the Applicant's complaint that her position was made redundant in a manner contrary to the provisions of Staff Rule 7.01, paragraphs 8.02(d) and 8.03, and that the decision to this effect was based on improper motive as it was taken in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment.

The Applicant claims that he was improperly paid for his services as a consultant in 1992-94, and that the Bank violated his contract of employment by paying him on a fixed “lump sum” basis rather than on a per diem basis for his work as Team Coordinator on two African case studies relating to Kenya and Zimbabwe. He claims compensation in the amount of $31,825 plus interest, other damages, attorneys’ fees and costs.

The subject of the application is the Applicant’s complaint that a ban was placed by the Bank on his rehiring as a consultant after retirement, a decision that violates the terms and conditions of his employment. The Applicant also complains that private information was released to third parties in violation of Bank rules. In addition, the Applicant complains that all of the above actions were tainted by improper motives because the Bank retaliated against him for the actions that he had taken to redress irregularities in the management of a Trust Fund.

The Applicant contests the Respondent’s decision to declare her position redundant under Staff Rule 7.01, paragraph 8.02(c), and requests the Tribunal to quash the impugned decision as constituting an abuse of authority.

The Applicant seeks review and reversal of a decision made by the Pension Benefits Administration Committee (PBAC) to deny her a disability pension. The Applicant, who was initially employed by the Bank in 1981 as an Arabic translator, was promoted to the position of Chief of the Arabic Section in 1989. She was serving in that position on January 25, 1994, when she was informed by her Division Chief that the Arabic, English and Russian programs were being merged, that the resulting Section was to be headed by the former Chief of the English Section, and that the Applicant was being asked to administer the Arabic program under his supervision; she was to have the title of Program Manager, without any change in grade or salary.

The Applicant complains that she was not fairly considered for conversion or extension of her fixed-term contract contrary to assurances allegedly given to her at the time of her recruitment and thereafter. She asserts that there were both procedural and substantive irregularities in decisions taken by the Respondent leading up, and related, to the decision neither to regularize nor to extend her contract. The Respondent’s position is that the Applicant had no right of employment beyond her fixed-term appointment and that none of its actions were improper.